We document that CRSP and Thomson contain many voluntarily reported mutual fund portfolios that are not in SEC filings while, additionally, CRSP and Thomson are missing many SEC mandated portfolios available in SEC filings. We document that the voluntary disclosures are likely driven by convenience rather than duplicity. Although mandated portfolios contain securities with more return momentum, we find use of SEC or Thomson data lead to similar empirical findings. CRSP, however, contains inaccurate position information prior to 2008. Our findings have important implications, such as highlighting a 35% increase in observed manager trading by combining data sources. (JEL G11, G23)
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Financial research has greatly benefited from data availability. Instead of hand-collecting data, researchers have largely relied on database vendors, such as the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Thomson Financial. Over time, researchers have examined these commercial databases for both their coverage and their reliability. For example, the accuracy of the CRSP Stock Databases has been improved through the documentation of various data issues (e.g., Rosenberg and Houglet 1974; Bennin 1980; Shumway 1997; Canina et al. 1998; Shumway and Warther 1999) . Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001) compare the coverage of CRSP Mutual Fund Database to that of Morningstar, and Evans (2010) finds some mutual funds are incubated, leading to backfilled returns. Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston's (2009) discovery of changes in the I/B/E/S database has led to more reliable data for researchers. Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) document an increase in data from combining hedge fund databases due to the voluntary nature of hedge fund reporting. These studies are important since financial research findings heavily depend on the availability and accuracy of the underlying data.
In this paper, we document that the Thomson Mutual Fund Holdings (Thomson) database contains many mutual fund portfolios reported as of dates not mandated by the 1940 Investment Company Act. At the same time, we find that many mandated mutual fund portfolio disclosures made in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings are not in Thomson. 1 Since
Thomson contains portfolios not reported in SEC filings, the non-SEC portfolios must be voluntarily disclosed by funds. Given the primary source for Thomson is often believed to be SEC filings and prior research documents the potential costs of more frequent portfolio 1 Throughout the manuscript, "SEC filings" refers to the Forms N-30D, N-CSR, and N-Q filings, which contain mutual fund portfolios as required by the 1940 Investment Company Act. "Thomson" refers to the Thomson Financial Mutual Fund Holdings data, also known as the s12 data file, which contains mutual fund portfolios. Thomson was previously known as the CDA Spectrum database (e.g., Wermers 1999) .
3 almost every month. These companies likely find it more efficient to simply report all of their funds' portfolios as of calendar quarter-ends when they also report other data to Thomson (e.g., Form 13F) . 3 The convenience motivation is supported by the fact that 98% of portfolios reported in Thomson are either as of SEC-mandated months or voluntary disclosures as of calendar quarter-end months.
Next, given the size of the mismatch, we compare the consistency of empirical findings using either Thomson or SEC data. To provide a complete analytical comparison, we handcollect the approximately 15,000 SEC filed portfolios not contained in Thomson. While we do find that portfolios reported to the SEC have securities with relatively higher return momentum as compared with voluntarily reported portfolios (e.g., window dressing), we find using either database leads to similar empirical conclusions. Specifically, both databases lead to similar estimates of manager skill and the cost of mandatory disclosure. Thus, we conclude that prior empirical findings that rely on Thomson's mixture of mandatory and voluntary portfolios are likely unbiased compared with results using only the mandatorily disclosed portfolios in SEC filings.
Finally, as with hedge fund data that are voluntarily reported, we document that combining mutual fund portfolio datasets leads to significantly more data to study. Adding SEC data to Thomson leads to a 25% increase in the observed number of positions and a 16% increase in observed position changes, or trading. The median trade size in the combined dataset is 33%
smaller due to enhanced precision from access to more frequent portfolios, and the average 3 Mutual fund companies directly provide data to database vendors. While Thomson did not clearly confirm this, Fidelity stated they directly provide data to Thomson. WRDS is also under the impression that Thomson receives data directly from fund companies. Additionally, Morningstar stated mutual fund companies directly provide data. To confirm Thomson is not simply collecting data from fund companies' Web sites, we examined twenty company Web sites, for which Thomson has voluntarily reported portfolios. We find that a large majority of these companies do not provide non-SEC portfolios via the Web.
4 maximum delay from when a trade occurs until when it is observed is reduced by three weeks. In 2008, when CRSP data become reliable, a CRSP, SEC, and Thomson combined dataset leads to an increase in observed trades of 35%, as well as a 50% reduction in median trade size and a one-month reduction in average trade delay as compared with Thomson only. These trade observation improvements are significant since prior studies (e.g., Puckett and Yan 2011; Elton, Gruber, and Blake 2011, 2012) find that increased disclosure frequency is important when examining managers' trading performance.
Our findings make several contributions to the commercial database coverage and reliability research and asset management literatures. First, we document that commercial mutual fund portfolio databases are not replicas of the mandatory SEC-filed portfolios; rather, they are combinations of voluntary and mandatory disclosures. More importantly, we find these databases do not contain all mandatory disclosures available through SEC filings for funds they cover.
Second, we document that incentives such as convenience can lead to financial firms providing more disclosure information than is required by regulatory agencies. Third, the use of CRSP portfolio data prior to the fourth quarter of 2007 should be avoided. Fourth, we demonstrate a significant increase in observed manager trading by combining multiple mutual fund portfolio databases.
Finally, although we find no significant empirical differences, researchers should perform their analyses using various portfolio datasets as a robustness check because some findings could be sensitive to database selection. For example, researchers should carefully consider the public availability of portfolios when examining how market participants utilize mutual funds' portfolio disclosures (e.g., Shive and Yun 2013; Solomon, Soltes, and Sosyura 2014 
Data and Mutual Fund Holdings Disclosure Rules
Mutual funds are heavily regulated by the SEC and are therefore required to report large amounts of data to regulators and fund shareholders. In this section, we specifically discuss the rules for mutual fund portfolio disclosure, as well as our data sources.
Disclosure rules for mutual funds
In this paper, we focus on the required portfolio reporting by mutual funds. Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, a mutual fund is required to report its holdings (or "portfolio") to the SEC, as well as to each individual fund shareholder, as of dates ("report dates") that coincide with its fiscal year-end. These disclosures must include all of the fund's portfolio positions, including, but not limited to common equities, preferred equities, options, bonds, and short positions. The required portfolio disclosures are found in the fund's SEC Forms N-30D, N-Q, and N-CSR filings. 5 These disclosures must be mailed to shareholders within sixty days of the report date and filed with the SEC's EDGAR database within ten days of the mailing.
The date this portfolio information is filed with EDGAR is known as the "file date," and the difference between the file date and report date is known as the "reporting delay."
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Although not examined in this paper, under the 1934 Securities Act, all mutual fund management companies with more than $100 million in 13(f) securities, such as publicly traded equities and bonds, must file SEC Form 13F. Form 13F is much different than the previously discussed mutual fund portfolio disclosure mandate. First, Form 13F is targeted at all institutional money managers, including hedge funds (e.g., Agarwal et al. 2013; Aragon, Hertzel, and Shi 2013; Brown and Schwarz 2015) . Second, Form 13F discloses holdings at the management company level. In other words, a management company (e.g., Fidelity) would report one company-level aggregated portfolio for all funds in a 13F, whereas each individual fund's (e.g., Magellan) portfolio is disclosed in the previously described SEC Forms N-30D, N-Q, and N-CSR. Third, Form 13F reports holdings information as of each calendar quarter-end and Form 13F must be filed within forty-five days of the report date.
Data sources
We gather mutual fund holdings data from three sources starting in 1996, when the SEC's EDGAR database came fully online, to 2008. The first source is the Thomson mutual fund holdings database (i.e., Thomson s12 data file), which is used in almost all studies that employ mutual fund portfolio holdings (e.g., Daniel et al. 1997; Wermers 2000; Coval and Stafford 2007; Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng 2008; Cremers et al. 2009; Huang, Sialm, and Zhang 2011; Wermers et al. 2012; Shive and Yun 2013) . Prior to its ownership by Thomson, this database was known as CDA Investment Technologies data (Daniel et al. 1997) , as well as the CDA Spectrum holdings database (Wermers 1999) . We restrict our sample to portfolios that have between 50% and 102% of their assets in common equity securities. It is possible for equity funds to have more than 102% of their assets invested in equities, but we often find that 7 portfolios with over 100% of net assets in equity positions contain errors related to stock splits. This is especially true in the third quarter of 1999.
We link these portfolios to the CRSP Survivorship Bias-Free Mutual Fund database (CRSP) using the MFLinks file available on WRDS. We filter our sample, removing portfolios belonging to funds with non-equity-related style codes or that are missing prior year return, asset, turnover, or expense data in CRSP. We then combine the Thomson and CRSP data with the portfolios contained in the previously described SEC Forms N-30D, N-CSR, and N-Q filings.
This process took a number of steps, which are outlined in Section A of the Online Appendix.
We only merge SEC portfolios for funds that are in our CRSP and Thomson data to keep the set of mutual funds consistent across all data sources. SEC portfolios' positions are contained in nonstandardized free text files. Later, we discuss the collection of these portfolios' positions in a tabulated format. Moreover, a combined dataset contains 25% more portfolios than does Thomson alone. To our knowledge, we are the first to document the mismatch between portfolio disclosures in the primary data source (e.g., SEC filings) and Thomson. 6 The overlap is significantly different during the two disclosure periods. In the SECmandated semiannual period (1996 , the match rate is less than 50%. This increases to 76% during the SEC-mandated quarterly disclosure period ( SH to 2008 . While the overlap rate is higher during this later period, the increase in portfolios achieved by combining sources is also larger. These changes are expected since twice as many portfolios are disclosed through SEC filings per year during the SEC-mandated quarterly disclosure period. Thus, even though the overlap is higher more recently, the advantage of combining datasets continues into the higher frequency disclosure regime.
In addition to the Thomson portfolios, we also have CRSP portfolios from 2003 SH to
2008. In Table 3 , we report results for a three-way comparison of CRSP, SEC, and Thomson portfolios for this period. We report the number of portfolios contained in only one of the data sources, the number contained in only two data sources, and, finally, the number of portfolios contained in all three databases. We also report the total number of portfolios available by combining all of the datasets (All combined) and the total number of portfolios available in each In addition to the entire CRSP availability period, we also report results from 2003 to 2007 Q3 (2007 Q4 to 2008) , when CRSP receives its data from Morningstar (Lipper). 7 As a baseline, we report results for our combined Thomson and SEC dataset over the entire sample period.
<Insert Table 3 about here> When adding CRSP, we find an even larger mismatch. Only 39% of portfolios overlap in all three data sources. As a comparison, Jorion and Schwarz (2014) Overall, we find that mutual fund portfolio databases have low degrees of overlap. CRSP
and Thomson contain a large number of portfolios voluntarily reported by funds not in SEC filings, while, perhaps more importantly, they are also missing a large number of SEC-mandated portfolios available in SEC filings. In other words, while the SEC database contains only mandatory portfolio disclosures, both Thomson and CRSP contain a mix of mandatory and voluntarily disclosed portfolios. Similar to hedge fund databases, combining multiple mutual fund holdings databases leads to much greater data availability.
2.2 Accuracy of portfolio position information
In the prior section, we find considerable differences in the report dates of the portfolios contained in our three data sources. In this section, we examine overlapping Thomson and CRSP portfolios to determine whether they contain identical equity position information. For each overlapping portfolio position, if the reported number of shares held is different or one of the sources does not list the position, we designate our Difference variable one, and zero otherwise.
We then compute the proportion of all positions across all portfolios that are different (Positions
pct. diff.).
We also report the average difference size (Position diff. size %), which is the absolute value of the share count difference, divided by the larger share count. Difference size is only computed if a difference exists. Finally, we count the number of portfolios in which 10%, 25%, and 50% or more of their positions differ across the two data sources. We report results by year, except for 2007, when CRSP changed data sources. We also aggregate results over the entire CRSP data period and the Morningstar (2003 Morningstar ( -2007 and Lipper (2007 Lipper ( Q4-2008 periods.
Results are reported in Table 4 , panel A.
<Insert Table 4 about here> We find surprising differences. Over the entire period, 14% of all positions disagree and 15% of portfolios have 25% or more of their equity positions different across the two sources.
These differences are significant, averaging more than 60% of the position size. We report this breakdown of portfolios in Table 5 . We report results for all funds, funds whose calendar and fiscal quarters align (Aligned funds), and funds whose calendar and fiscal quarters do not align (Unaligned funds). We also report results with and without index funds by removing funds with "index" or "idx" in their names.
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<Insert After eliminating periods in which the management company only has one fund, we average these values for each company across reporting periods and report the distribution in Figure 1 .
Companies with an average of 100% (0%) never (always) selectively disclose voluntary portfolios for their funds.
<Insert Figure 1 Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008) . When calculating DGTW returns, we identify the most recently reported portfolio for each fund at the beginning of each calendar quarter. 13 We assume the portfolio security weights are the same at the beginning of the quarter as when reported them. We then compute the future one-, three-, and twelve-month weighted average DGTW returns for each fund. We compute averages across all funds each quarter and report results using Fama-Macbeth (1973) for both SEC and Thomson, as well as the differences between the two databases.
In addition to reporting the cross-sectional means, we examine how consistent fund rankings are across datasets. We rank funds each quarter by their one-and three-month DGTW returns. We then place funds into quintiles based on their rankings. To compare rankings, we create a contingency table of SEC and Thomson rankings. If the cross-sectional rankings for funds are the same regardless of dataset, the diagonal terms will be 100% and the off-diagonal terms will be 0%.
We also run similar cross-sectional mean and ranking computations using funds' return gaps. Return gaps are computed as outlined by Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008) . In summary, we compute the difference between the actual net return reported in CRSP and a simulated return based on the most recent portfolio of the fund. Results for the DGTW and return gap analyses are reported in Table 6 <Insert Table 6 about here>
Our results indicate that manager skill analyses are independent of data source choice.
DGTW averages and cross-sectional rankings are similar between the two sources. Skill averages are similar across datasets, and 85% of funds are within the same performance quintile.
Although largely consistent, the return gap results show more dataset dependency. The SEC return gap estimates are higher, and although cross-sectional rankings are still strong, they not as stable. One reason for larger return gap differences is SEC portfolios are relatively more distant, or stale, at the start of a calendar quarter from the portfolio used to calculate the actual net return of the fund. 14 With that said, either dataset produces largely similar conclusions. Thus, database selection appears not to be an issue when evaluating manager skill.
Performance characteristics of portfolio holdings
Prior research finds evidence that equity fund managers "window dress" their disclosed portfolios. For example, prior researchers find that institutional equity fund managers window dress their portfolios by overweighting recent high-performing securities (e.g., Lakonishok et al. 1991; O'Neal 2001; Meier and Schaumburg 2004) . However, Musto (1999) finds that managers' window dressing actions depend on whether the portfolio is a voluntary or mandatory disclosure.
Thus, mandatory SEC-disclosed portfolios may provide higher estimates of return momentum window dressing by managers when compared to the voluntary disclosed Thomson portfolios.
To examine this possibility, we compute each portfolio's value-weighted average raw and DGTW security returns for various time frames. For each calendar month, we separate portfolios into SEC portfolios and voluntarily reported Thomson portfolios. For each group, we compute the equal-weighted average return across funds. Finally, we compute the annualized return differences between the two groups, where positive values indicate higher values for the SEC portfolios. We compute differences using both the SEC portfolios included in Thomson (SEC in Thmn only) and all the SEC portfolios (All SEC). Overall values are computed using FamaMacbeth (1973) , and standard errors are calculated using Newey-West (1987) , with the number of lags equaling the number of monthly returns used in the return calculation. Results are reported in Table 7 .
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<Insert Table 7 about here> We find evidence consistent with window dressing results being stronger for mandatorily disclosed portfolios. SEC portfolios have higher prior average returns than do non-SEC portfolios. This is especially true in the month prior to disclosure, with a statistically and economically significant difference of 6%, suggesting managers focus most on short-term performance. 15 Thus, in circumstances in which the research question involves investigating manager actions due to disclosure, researchers should make a distinction between mandatory and voluntary portfolio disclosures as the strength of results may depend on the disclosure type.
Cost of mandatory disclosure
Requiring mutual funds to disclose portfolios on a regular basis allows hedge fund We begin by examining the profitability of front-running predictable mutual fund flows.
We run our analysis consistent with Coval and Stafford (2007) . However, in this case, rather than use the report date of the portfolio when running the analysis, we choose the most recent portfolio based on file dates as this is the most recent portfolio speculators would have access to.
When using SEC data, we use the file dates recorded with EDGAR. However, this information is not available for all Thomson portfolios since voluntarily disclosed portfolios are not filed with EDGAR. Thus, consistent with the literature, we assume all portfolios have a sixty-day filing delay when using Thomson data. 16 We split stocks into decile portfolios based on the percent of shares outstanding mutual funds are expected to buy over the next quarter. We report the average quarterly portfolio raw and DGTW returns for these decile portfolios in Table 8 , omitting some deciles for the sake of brevity. We report results for our entire sample period, as well as results for the SEC-mandated semiannual portfolio disclosure period (1996 to 2004 FH) and the quarterly portfolio-mandated SEC disclosure period ( SH to 2008 . We separate these periods as quarterly portfolio updates could make front-running more profitable since speculators would, on average, have more accurate position information over time (e.g., Wermers 2000) . Overall coefficients and tvalues are computed using Fama-Macbeth (1973) .
<Insert Table 8 about here> We find similar results using SEC or Thomson data. Similar to Coval and Stafford (2007) , stocks with the highest flows significantly outperform stocks with the lowest flows over the entire period. During the more frequent quarterly portfolio-mandated disclosure period, frontrunning is unprofitable. 16 In untabulated results, we examine the distribution of EDGAR filing delays. On average, the delay is sixty days and is approximately the same over time. Most funds take at least fifty-seven days to disclose their portfolios to the SEC. These results are consistent with those of Brown and Schwarz (2015) , who find that hedge funds wait until the end of their filing delay period to file their Form 13Fs with the SEC.
In analyzing the consistency of disclosure cost results across databases, we also evaluate copycatting results using the framework and assumptions of Verbeek and Wang (2013) . We compare copycat net returns to the actual net returns of the underlying funds. Negative differences indicate the copycat fund outperforms. We compute the average difference each month for our sample period and then average the differences across time. We report results in Table 9 . In panel A, we report results on the raw and absolute differences. Absolute differences measure the tracking error of the copycat fund. In panel B, we again examine tracking error. For each fund, we calculate the t-value of the difference between the fund's actual net return and the copycat fund's net return.
We report the distribution of these t-values. Significantly negative t-values indicate the copycat fund significantly outperforms the underlying fund. In both panels, we report results for the entire sample period, during the SEC-mandated semiannual portfolio disclosure period (1996 to 2004 FH), and for the quarterly portfolio-mandated SEC disclosure period ( SH to 2008 .
We again separate these periods as quarterly portfolio updates provide speculators more accurate information over time, reducing tracking error.
<Insert Table 9 about here> We again find similar results using either dataset. The average copycat fund outperforms its underlying fund, similar to Verbeek and Wang (2013) . With that said, we do find some minor differences between the two sets of results. Copycat funds using SEC portfolios have higher tracking error than those using the Thomson portfolios. This is likely due to SEC portfolios being more stale, on average, at the beginning of each calendar quarter. Additionally, Thomson has more portfolios per year during the semi-annual-mandated disclosure period for many funds, which also reduces tracking error. The higher tracking error leads to fewer copycat funds outperforming their underlying funds when using SEC portfolios.
In summary, we find similar estimates for the cost of mandatory disclosure using either
Thomson or SEC data. Thus, using either Thomson or SEC data, as with estimates of manager skill, is likely to lead to similar findings.
Implications
In the prior section, we find empirical results are largely similar using either Thomson or SEC data. Based on our empirical analysis and comparisons of SEC, Thomson, and CRSP mutual fund portfolios, we have four primary recommendations. First, we avoid CRSP portfolio data before 2007 Q4 due to their inaccurate position information. Second, for robustness, we recommend running empirical tests using only SEC data as some empirical findings may be sensitive to the inclusion of voluntarily reported data. The final two implications we discuss more thoroughly below: the increase in observed trading by combining datasets, as well as the impact of disclosure type on data availability.
Increase of observed trading by merging datasets
More frequent portfolio disclosures, leading to better trade information, is one major implication of combining datasets, Greater data availability is particularly useful for studies that examine manager trades. as well as reactions to information events such as earnings announcements. For example, using Table 1 as an illustration, we observe the fund's ATVI position increased in July 2007 in the combined dataset rather than having to wait until September 2007 using only Thomson.
To quantify the benefits of more portfolios, we examine the increase in the number of trades, as well as the quality of trade information observed by combing databases. For example,
we calculate the trade size in shares. We also compute the maximum number of days between when the trade could have occurred and when we observe the trade. Both of these characteristics help quantify the reduction in the gap between trading occurrences and trading observations.
With more frequent portfolios, we should find trade sizes that are smaller over time, thereby reducing the maximum time delay between trade action and observation, similar to the prior ATVI example. We report results for this analysis in Table 10 .
<Insert Table 10 Combining databases leads to a significant increase in observed trading. Using Thomson and SEC data together, we observe 8.8 million positions and 6.34 million trades, a 25% and 16% increase, respectively. Trade metrics improve substantially. The average (median) trade size declines to 101,826 (6,453) , and the average (median) maximum delay is reduced to 95 (92) days. In other words, combining data reduces observed median trade sizes by 33%, while trade information is available, on average, nearly three weeks sooner. In 2008, when we can also draw from CRSP data, we find an even larger advantage from using all three data sources. As compared with only using Thomson, we find a 50% increase in observed positions, a 35% increase in observed trades, a 50% reduction in trade size, and a one-month reduction in trade observation delay.
Overall, combining datasets is advantageous to researchers. Not only does this lead to more portfolios but this also leads to a large corresponding increase in the amount and quality of trading information.
Portfolio availability
Voluntary reporting to CRSP and Thomson has important implications for studies that rely on the knowledge of portfolio holdings. Presently, studies presume that portfolios in
Thomson represent SEC portfolio disclosures and are therefore homogenous in terms of access and availability. It is likely, however, that there are significant differences in the public availability and timing of Thomson's voluntary disclosures vis-à-vis mandatory SEC disclosures.
First, only those investors who subscribe to CRSP or Thomson can observe the voluntary filings. These subscribers are likely to be institutional investors given the cost of these databases.
Since a large proportion of mutual fund shareholders are likely noninstitutions, most fund shareholders likely exclusively observe portfolios through mandated SEC disclosures. It is therefore advantageous for studies that examine mutual fund investor reactions (e.g., Solomon, Soltes, and Sosyura 2014) to use only mandatory disclosures available to everyone.
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17 Some of the portfolios voluntarily reported to CRSP and Thomson may be available to investors through other data sources, such as fund companies' Web pages. However, when we sampled a number of voluntarily reporting fund companies' Web sites, we found very few voluntarily disclosed portfolios. Thus, many voluntary disclosures in commercial databases will only be available to subscribers. For these reasons, researchers should carefully determine whether the use of voluntarily disclosed portfolios is appropriate for their studies. More generally, although most empirical results are likely agnostic about the choice of Thomson or SEC data, we suggest researchers run results using each dataset individually as a robustness check, especially those research hypotheses that rely on the timing of portfolio availability as mixing voluntary and mandatory portfolios could confound any results related to market reactions to portfolio disclosures.
Conclusion
In this paper, we document that mutual fund portfolios as of different dates are reported to different data sources. From 1996 to 2008, only 48% of the total number of portfolios available across Thomson and SEC filings for the same set of funds appear in both datasets.
Thirty-two percent of the portfolios are only reported in Thomson, and 20% are only reported in SEC filings. When examining CRSP, SEC, and Thomson data together, only 39% of portfolios overlap. Given the primary source for CRSP and Thomson is believed to be SEC filings, these low overlap rates are surprising. It is also curious to observe mutual funds providing more portfolio data than mandated, given the potential for front-running and copycatting.
We document the primary motivation for these voluntary filings to likely be due to In this table, we report results comparing estimates of manager skill using SEC and Thomson data. In panels A and B, we report results related to future DGTW returns of the funds' portfolios. At the beginning of each quarter, we find the most recent portfolio disclosed for each fund and then compute its future one-, three-, and twelve-month raw and DGTW returns. In panel A, we then compute overall time-series averages and t-values using Fama-Macbeth (1973) . In panel B, we place funds in quintiles each quarter based on their SEC and Thomson computed one-and three-month DGTW ranks. We then report a contingency table comparing quintiles in which funds are placed. In panels C and D, we report similar results, except for the return gap measure. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Fama-Macbeth (1973) to compute the average differences with standard errors computed using Newey-West (1987) with lags equal to the number of months used to calculate the return values. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. This table reports returns from front-running flow-induced mutual fund trading. For each quarter, we estimate the expected flow into each stock as the total number of shares mutual funds are expected to buy (sell), scaled by the stock's average daily volume over the prior six months. We then place stocks in decile portfolios based on their expected flow, where decile one has the lowest expected flow. For each quarter, we compute the value-weighted raw and DGTW returns for each portfolio for the next quarter. We compute returns for the entire sample period, as well as for the SEC-mandated semiannual disclosure period (1996 and the SEC-mandated quarterly disclosure period ( SH-2008 . We compute returns using only portfolios in Thomson and those in SEC filings. Public disclosure dates for the SEC dataset are the file dates with EDGAR, and the public disclosure dates for the Thomson dataset are sixty days after the portfolio's report date. Overall coefficients and t-values are computed using Fama-Macbeth (1973) . ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. This table reports results using disclosed portfolios to "copycat" mutual funds. For each, month we compute a fund's equity portfolio return using the value-weighted returns of the securities held on its most recent publicly disclosed portfolio. Public disclosure dates for the SEC dataset are the file dates with EDGAR, and the public disclosure dates for the Thomson dataset are sixty days after the portfolio's report date. We then combine this return with the cash and fixed income returns to compute the copycat gross return based on the fund's portfolio weights in CRSP. This return is reduced by the monthly average of the copycat fund's transaction costs, as well as by one-twelfth of 20 bps, which is an administrative fee. We then compute the difference between the actual fund return and the copycat return with a negative value equating to copycat fund outperformance. In panel A, we report the monthly averages, as well as the t-values computed using the Fama-Macbeth (1973) approach. We also report the average absolute differences, which represents tracking error. We additionally report the t-values for the difference between the Thomson and SEC values. In panel B, we compute the t-values for each fund's difference between the copycat fund returns and actual fund returns and report the distribution of those t-values. In both panels, SEC represents copycat returns computed using SEC data, and Thomson represents copycat returns computed using Thomson data. Semi reports results during the SEC's mandated semiannual disclosure period (1996 , and Qtr reports results during the SEC's mandated quarterly disclosure period ( SH-2008 . 
A. Future returns

A. Copycat returns
